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Since the first decade of the millennium – for the first time in human history – more
people are living in urban areas than in rural ones. According to UN projections, in
2050 the share of urban populations could rise to more than two thirds of the world
population. Will this demographic change also lead to a decline of nation-states and
a rise of cities as the dominant arenas of politics, democracy and citizenship? My
response will be ambivalent.
Yes, cities should play a greater role in addressing global problems, such as the
climate crisis or international refugee protection, where sovereign states have failed
dismally precisely because their sovereignty hampers cooperative solutions. Yes,
cities should experiment vigorously with democratic innovations that could diminish
the severe legitimacy crisis experienced by representative democracy in many
countries around the world. Yes, cities should determine who their citizens are
independently of how states do this.
No, contrary to the catchy title of the late Ben Barber’s book (2013), mayors should
not rule the world. No, cities cannot replace nation-states and supranational
institutions as political arenas that need to be filled with democratic life and to whom
citizens can feel to belong. No, national citizenship should not be based on the same
principle of membership as urban citizenship.
We need a new citizenship narrative
There are two reasons for my ambivalence. The first is my belief that the global
problems that the international system of sovereign states is unable to address
require a multilevel political architecture, in which supranational, regional and
local political authorities play different but complementary roles. The European
Union, in spite of its many structural weaknesses and policy failures, shows how
state sovereignty can be pooled. Multilevel democracy beyond the nation-state
is a European idea that is worth promoting in other world regions. Yet multilevel
democracy requires also that citizenships at various territorial levels must be
complementary and not substitutive.
The second reason has to do with the ‘democratic recession’ (Diamond 2015) and
the rise of populism. According to many diagnoses these threats result from new
political cleavages that cut across the traditional one between left and right (Kriesi
et al. 2008). The new divisions are between attitudes in favour of more open or
more closed states and societies; between those embracing cultural and gender
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diversity and those asserting conservative national and religious values; between
those who worry about the climate crisis and those who worry about their traditional
ways of life. The former are overwhelmingly concentrated in metropolitan regions
and university towns, the latter are more widely dispersed across rural areas and
declining industrial towns as well as working class neighbourhoods of larger cities.
This divide is also closely associated with patterns of increasing geographic mobility
among younger urban populations that disconnects their spaces of opportunity and
imagined identities from those of sedentary majority populations whose life worlds
remain predominantly local and national ones.
Liberals and democrats may hope that the growth of urban populations and the
persistence of more open attitudes among younger cohorts will eventually swing the
political pendulum towards greater openness (Lutz 2012). However, current electoral
systems often give greater weight to voters outside the big cities (Rodden 2019),
enabling political victories of illiberal populists who can wreak havoc by destroying
democratic institutions and the capacity of states to tackle the global challenges of
our time. The response cannot be just to politically mobilise those who are already
in favour of more open societies – although it is certainly very important to do so.
Radical democrats (Mouffe 2005) emphasize the need for partisan mobilisation and
radical urbanists (Bookchin 1987; Harvey 2008) pitch the city as a site of struggle
against neoliberal capitalism or a laboratory for emancipatory democracy and
ecological utopias against the nation-state. Beyond mobilisation that articulates and
deepens the new cleavages, there is, however, an urgent need for new narratives
that can bridge them.
Such narratives have been successfully told in the past when democracies faced
new challenges. And they focused on the idea of a common citizenship – as a status
and bond that is able to support a sense of equality and unity in difference. After
World War Two the British sociologist T. H. Marshall (1949/1965) justified the effort
to build a welfare state in response to intolerable inequalities of social class, the
acceptance of which had been undermined by the sacrifices of ordinary British
people during the war. His story was that after the emergence of universal civil rights
in the 18th century and political rights in the 19th, 20th century democracy needed
social citizenship, i.e. a floor of social equality provided through public services and
redistribution that could provide legitimacy for the inequality of social outcomes in
capitalist markets.
In the 1990s the Canadian political philosopher Will Kymlicka (1995) commented
that Marshall’s model for integrating the working class through social citizenship
could not provide a template for how to integrate culturally divided societies with
indigenous peoples, national minorities and immigrants from diverse origins. His
response was again framed in the language of citizenship. In order to build fully
inclusive liberal nations, culturally diverse democracies had to provide minorities with
differentiated rights to cultural accommodation, special recognition and territorial self-
government. The point of calling this a project of multicultural citizenship was that
Kymlicka – in contrast with most critics of multiculturalism – was convinced that it
would help to unite national societies rather than segregate them along cultural lines.
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A citizenship narrative for our times must not abandon these older ones. Social
inequality and cultural diversity remain among the most pressing challenges and
Marshall’s and Kymlicka’s answers to these seem to me still fundamentally the right
ones. But we have to face new problems now that can no longer be contained within
the nation-state, which both Marshall and Kymlicka assumed to be the self-evident
and stable background for integration through citizenship. If such a new story aims to
bridge cleavages and integrate divided societies, it cannot be only about the city. It
must instead tell urban and rural, young and old, mobile and sedentary populations
what they have in common and why they have to respect each other as equals who
share a stake in institutions that express their common desire for democratic self-
government.
I believe that such a narrative must be about multilevel as well as transnational
citizenship. For this reason, it must take sides and embrace the open society side
of the globalization divide, just like Marshall’s story focused on the benefits for
those deprived of substantive citizenship through market inequalities and just like
Kymlicka’s focused on the benefits for disadvantaged cultural minorities. And this
means that an attractive vision of urban citizenship must be at the core of the new
story since it is in the big cities that mobile populations find their homes while their
voices and votes remain all too often unheard and undercounted in national arenas.
Yet, again like the two earlier narratives, the story must have a broader appeal if it
aims to re-integrate democracies and strengthen their problem-solving capacity.
Three accounts of urban citizenship and a fourth
alternative
Once upon a time, all citizenship was urban. Rural folks didn’t have citizenship and
town-folks had it only if they were both lucky and tenacious in fighting to get and
keep it. This time is not a distant past. Less than 250 years ago, the American and
French Revolution introduced a modern conception of national citizenship that tore
down the physical and institutional walls that had protected free cities. Empires, most
of which were eventually destroyed from within by national, democratic and colonial
revolutions, had subjects rather than citizens, but they lacked the instruments
of social control over territorial populations wielded by the modern nation-state.
Empires left thus lots of space for local autonomy. Cities with independent sources
of wealth owed allegiance to emperors and the rulers of principalities, but they had
a fighting chance to establish themselves as free republics within autocratically rules
territories (Prak 2018).
The democratic revolutions that invented the new notion of a national citizenship
inherited ideals about freedom, equality and collective self-government from the city
republics that they destroyed. But the new conception of citizenship also created
something historically entirely new by turning citizenship into a device for sorting
human populations into states (Brubaker 1989). Citizenship as nationality is no
longer just a domestic privilege but a status in the international system. It is still
particularistic in the sense of linking individuals to specific states but at the same
time universal in the sense of aiming to categorize all of humanity.
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Talking about urban citizenship in this context has seemed anachronistic for a
long time. No longer so today. Yet any conception of urban citizenship worthy of
consideration must figure out the relation between nation-states and cities – both in
the sense of structural constraints that the former imposes on the latter and in the
sense of more or less utopian visions how to overcome these.
Three different accounts of this relation emerge from present debates, which we can
call diminutive, derivative and postnational urban citizenship.
The first view captures the ‘constitutional silence’ (Hirschl 2020 forthcoming)
on the powers of local level government in many democratic constitutions and
the treatment of municipalities as creatures of higher level governments whose
borders and competencies are determined by them for the sake of administrative
convenience. This is the attitude prevailing in the US and Canadian federations as
well as in continental European centralized states like France or the Scandinavian
countries. The diminutive view of urban citizenship may not see a problem with
thoroughly undemocratic practices, such as the appointment of mayors by the
central government, which was common in 19th century Europe or the still existing
plutocratic franchise in several Australian cities (Ng, Goghill, and Thornton-Smith
2016) and the City of London that gives business corporations and real estate
owners extra votes in local elections. A diminutive view shines also through in some
interpretations of the expansion of the local franchise to immigrants independently
of their nationality in fourteen European and eight South American states (Arrighi
and Bauböck 2017; Pedroza 2019). On this account, immigrants can be optionally
included in the local demos because the matters decided at local level are of minor
importance or because local citizenship for immigrants is merely considered as
a training ground for national citizenship (See e.g. Patti Lenard’s review of Luicy
Pedroza (2019) for GLOBALCIT.).
A derivative conception gives more weight to urban citizenship by regarding
it as similar to citizenship in the constitutive polities of a federation (cantons,
provinces, regions or states). Citizenship in a US state is derived from federal
citizenship and attributed to all federal citizens who take up residence in a state.
Why not extend this principle further down in a triple-level federation that would
give constitutional status also to municipalities? In fact, countries like Austria,
Germany and Switzerland are triple-level federations of this kind. In the former two,
Constitutional Courts have invoked a principle of homogeneity of the federal people
in order to strike down attempts by cities to introduce local voting rights for (non-EU)
foreigners (See the GLOBALCIT reports on access to electoral rights in Austria and
Germany). Switzerland has taken a different path, since it is still in some aspects a
confederation in which federal citizenship is derived upwards from the lower levels
of municipalities and cantons. This has enabled some cantons to introduce the
local franchise for non-Swiss citizens or to allow their municipalities to adopt such
rules for themselves. Cities in two-level federations could adopt a similar strategy
by campaigning for their upgrading into a federal province, as Toronto has done for
some time.
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A third interpretation of urban citizenship is postnational. It aims to sever the relation
between city and state as much as possible and tells a story about the emancipation
of cities from the chokehold of the nation-state through forging transnational city
networks (Acuto 2013), through promoting new forms of direct democracy, such as
participatory budgeting and randomly selected citizens’ assemblies (Smith 2011),
through providing sanctuary to irregular immigrants whom national governments
want to deport (Varsanyi 2006), through issuing city ID cards (de Graauw 2014), and
also through enfranchising those who lack the national approval stamp of the right
passport.
This postnational view gets many things right. Democracy is strengthened if cities do
all these things. But the justifications for doing them cannot rely only on the interests
of migrants and urban populations. We need to think how urban citizenship could
contribute to overall democratic integration within and beyond nation-states.
Consider again the case of the local non-citizen franchise. In EU member states
it is derivative from EU citizenship, which is in turn derived from the nationality of
one of the member states. In most cases this means that only EU citizens can vote
in local elections. In twelve EU countries, however, non-EU citizen can vote as
well. The demos that authorises local governments through democratic elections
is thus composed of all residents in the city. Instead of giving immigrants special
representation (for example in elected advisory bodies) citizenship is attributed to all
co-residents no matter where they come from.
This is appropriate because the distinction between nationals and non-nationals
is irrelevant from the perspective of local democracy. In order to safeguard the
human right to free movement inside the territory of states, municipalities must
have open borders and cannot control who takes up residence in their territory.
They have to provide public services for local populations who select themselves
into municipalities by taking up residence, by moving out or by staying. Urban
citizenship must therefore be constructed in such a way that it integrates mobile
populations into a common membership and this is achieved through deriving it
from residence instead of territorial birth or descent. The integrity and inclusiveness
of local democracy would be jeopardized if those born in the city or descending
from parents established in the city enjoy special privileges – as they do under
the Chinese hukou system of household registration. Local democracy is equally
undermined if large urban populations remain disenfranchised because they do not
hold national citizenship.
A citizenship based on ius domicilii creates a status of equality that is uniquely
appropriate for cities as it can be shared by sedentary and mobile populations
(Bauböck 2003; Bauder 2014; de Shalit 2018). But it cannot be limited to cities
only. It applies just as much to rural municipalities and small towns as to large
cities. If everybody has a right to free movement within a national territory, then
everybody must be regarded as a local citizen in any municipality where she takes
up residence. Local citizenship is therefore not just urban; it is a basic status of local
equality among co-residents in a country.
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Complementing, not replacing national citizenship
This does not mean that local citizenship is going to replace national citizenship.
Non-national residents who are turned into local citizens retain their nationality
of origin and it is this status that provides them with free movement rights in the
international system. They have an unconditional right to return to their country
of nationality and – if they are multiple citizens – can freely move between their
countries of origin and destination. Native citizens sharing a local citizenship with
immigrants also need their national citizenship when they emigrate – as a protection
when they are abroad and a guarantee that they can return. Finally, for sedentary
people whose life plans do not reach across international borders as well as for
migrants, national citizenship signals their belonging to an intergenerational political
community. The fact that national citizenship is attributed at birth to people who have
been thrown together without exercising choice is a resource for solidarity in mobile
and diverse societies that a more ephemeral local membership based on residence
cannot equally generate (Bauböck 2017).
That is of course only true if national citizenship itself is sufficiently open for
naturalisation of immigrants and automatically includes second generations
born in the territory. Such openness does not erase the difference between
local and national memberships. Only national citizenship based on birthright
(be it ius sanguinis or ius soli) can currently guarantee sufficient stability of
democratic citizenries across generations. This is essential for promoting a sense
of responsibility for the future of a country and its institutions, for a stable allocation
of state responsibility for protecting individuals in the international state system, and
also for enabling international free movement that states are only willing to grant to
the citizens of other states on a basis of reciprocity.
Similar caveats apply to dreams about cities resolving the global collective action
problems that states have been unable to tackle. Even if cities form international
networks these are by their very nature selective in membership and geographic
scope and cannot substitute for the role of states in creating international institutions
and law. Globally networked cities can set agendas and locally demonstrate the
feasibility of solutions for the biggest problems facing humanity, but they cannot
create binding rules and secure their implementation on a global scale (Aust 2017).
What we need therefore is an urban citizenship that is derived from residence rather
than nationality and that complements national citizenship instead of replacing it.
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